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Abstract—Digital security technology is able to identify and
prevent many threats to users accounts. However, some threats
remain that, to provide reliable security, require human interven-
tion: e.g., through users paying attention to warning messages
or completing secondary authentication procedures. While prior
work has broadly explored people’s mental models of digital
security threats, we know little about users’ precise, in-the-
moment response process to in-the-wild threats. In this work, we
conduct a series of qualitative interviews (n=67) with users who
had recently experienced suspicious login incidents on their real
Facebook accounts in order to explore this process of account
security incident response. We find a common process across
participants from five countries – with differing online and offline
cultures – allowing us to identify areas for future technical
development to best support user security. We provide additional
insights on the unique nature of incident-response information
seeking, known attacker threat models, and lessons learned from
a large, cross-cultural qualitative study of digital security.
I. INTRODUCTION
State of the art security technology can keep out many
malicious actors from user accounts. However, automated
detection and protection systems are not perfect; humans
must still practice security behaviors: e.g., avoiding clicking
through SSL warnings, completing secondary authentication
tasks. Prior work has explored how best to design warning
messages and phishing trainings to keep users away from
dangers [1]–[11]. Other work has examined how people learn
security behaviors from stories of negative experiences [12]–
[14], and yet other work has theoretically explored users’
mental models of warnings or security [15]–[19]. In these
works, researchers typically simulate an attack in the lab, ask
people to consider a theoretical scenario, or ask them to reflect
on experiences that may have occurred in the distant past. While
useful, theoretical approaches may lack ecological validity and
requiring users to recall an incident long after it occurred may
lead to omissions or distortions of collected data. As such, we
have little understanding of how users respond when their real,
valued accounts are threatened [20].
Our work takes a first step toward filling this gap: we conduct
a series of open-ended qualitative interviews (n=67) soon after
an in the wild security incident took place on participants’
real Facebook accounts.1 We specifically examine incidents
in which Facebook identified and blocked a suspicious login
to a user account, notified the user of this incident, and then
1Facebook has over 2 billion users worldwide [21], approximately two thirds
of the estimated population currently online [22].
asked the user to perform a secondary authentication task to
regain access to their account. We use anonymized Facebook
log records to identify and recruit participants, eliminating the
need to recruit people based upon potentially biased self-reports.
In our interviews, we asked participants to walk us through
their experience of the incident. This included asking them
about their feelings, information seeking processes, concerns
over their account’s compromise, and actions following the
incident (which we validated, when possible, with log records).
To both facilitate broader generalizability and explore how
incident response may be influenced by user and environment
characteristics, we recruited participants from five countries that
differ in online and offline cultural context: Brazil, Germany, In-
dia, the United States, and Vietnam. Based on rigorous analysis
of the interview transcripts and timelines (Kripendorff’s alpha =
0.87) we identify and instantiate a common process of account
security incident response (Figure 3). This process consists of
incident awareness, mental model generation, and behavioral
response. Variations in process execution are driven by the
information users obtain through in-the-moment information
seeking, users’ threat models and past experiences, and three
attributes of their cultural context: degree of Internet censorship,
cultural collectivism – as measured by Hofstede’s indices [23]
– and differentiated platform use.
We find that mental models are driven by the notification
process in combination with participants? general threat models
(what and who they fear online). While these mental models
typically fall into either the category of false positives (e.g.,
this notification was caused by my actions, like logging in
from a new location) and true positives (someone is attacking
me), some participants formed surprising mental models, like
perceiving the notification as a punitive action to correct
misbehavior. Further, for participants who believed the incident
about which they were notified was a real threat, wide variance
in general threat models, emotional reactions to the notification
and thought of attack, and differences in cultural and country-
based Internet contexts resulted in a wide variance of protective
behaviors.
In addition to defining this process of account security
incident response, we also qualitatively identify what made
the suspicious login notification process we studied relatively
effective2. Chiefly, attention capture through a unique, interac-
2Over one third of participants in our study took what they perceived as
a protective behavior after regaining access to their account (e.g., changing
password, being more vigilant online).
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tive task and the creation of a sense of partnership between the
user and the platform We also identified areas for improvement
such as leveraging users? own intuition and addressing known
attackers when creating secondary authentication mechanisms.
II. RELATED WORK
Prior work on security incidents has focused heavily on the
efficacy of warnings [3], [52]–[54]. Researchers have consid-
ered users’ general mental models of the Internet [55], [56]
and how those mental models influence security [17]. Further
work has explored mental models of security threats [16], [57],
[58]; and Rader and Wash define a taxonomy of these threat
models, which are unknown to the victim. Additional prior
work provides a more general examination of user’s negative
experiences, including reflections on negative experiences with
software updates [13] and the effect of stories about negative
security experiences on user behavior [59]. We add to the
body of knowledge on threat models by (a) defining the
process by which threat models influence incident response, (b)
illustrating how these threat models interact with information
seeking behavior and emotional response, and (c) expanding
the taxonomy of threat models by identifying four new folk
models for known attackers (Section IV).
Incident Response. Most related to our work, Shay et
al. surveyed U.S. Amazon Mechanical Turk crowd workers
about whether they had ever experienced an account hijacking
(someone taking over an email or social network account), to
recall their concerns were about the incident, and to recall
what they had thought had happened [35]. We build on
their initial exploration by deeply examining how a multi-
cultural population responded to a specific, in-the-wild incident,
immediately after that incident; construct an end-to-end model
of the process of incident response; and illustrate that incident
response is not only influenced by the incident notification – a
factor also explored in the work of Shay et al. – but is also
heavily influenced by additional factors we identify, such as
in-the-moment information seeking, past experiences, cultural
context, and strength of mental models.
Echoing the findings of Shay et al., we find that people
have emotional reactions to security incidents, including fear
and feelings of safety, that influence the process of incident
response. Regarding protective behaviors, Shay et al. found that
their users focused on passwords and password strength when
forming mental models of how their account was compromised
. In contrast, we find that while our participants mention
passwords, they focus on a wide array of methods through
which their accounts could have compromised and and also
use a wide array of post-incident protective behaviors. These
differences may in part be due to the difference in time between
our two studies (2013 to 2018) or due to the differences in
the demographics of our samples as U.S. users may have been
trained to focus on passwords more so than users in other
countries.
Additionally, both Shay et al. and Rainie et al. [60] found that
U.S. users are primarily concerned about unknown attackers
(e.g., hackers); while work by Kang et al. [51] on the privacy
beliefs and views of Indian users showed an emphasis on
government actors. The findings of our study echo Kang et
al.’s findings that Indian users tend to focus on government
attackers. We expand this out to find that a more general
trend that this may be due to levels of internet censorship,
as the Vietnamese participants in our study (also a censored
country) also focused on government actors. Further, users in
different countries may conceptualize their attackers differently:
Rainie et al. break down attackers that the user knows based
on their relationship to the user (friend, colleague), while our
participants – primarily those from non-western countries –
categorized their attackers by motivation (humiliation, spying
for others). In combination, our work shows that users’ mental
models of attackers are quite complex: comprising the users’
relationship to the attacker, the attackers’ motivation, and what
the attacker might access.
Cross-cultural security. Prior cross-cultural work in secu-
rity has focused on comparisons between two countries (often
the US vs. another country). Topics covered include enterprise
security [61], Internet buying behavior [62], online banking
security [63], [64], privacy beliefs [51], and, in one case, general
mental models [65]. A smaller set of papers has examined
aspects of security across larger number of countries [50],
[66]–[69]. For example, Sawaya et al. surveyed users from
seven different countries (not including South America or
Southeast Asia) regarding their intention to behave securely,
finding variance in intended action and security knowledge
between cultures [50]. These works have all supported the need
for a more nuanced examination of digital security from the
lens of different user populations; a call echoed specifically for
cross-cultural examinations in Crossler et al.’s position paper
on future directions for behavioral cybersecurity research [70].
Our work takes another step toward answering that call: here,
we report the first interview study on digital security conducted
across more than two countries. Considering multiple countries
allowed for an important addition to cross-cultural security
analysis: the consideration of culture as a set of dimensions
(e.g., Internet penetration, Internet censorship, platform use
types). These dimensions allowed us to identify potential effects
of culture on user security more precisely than if we had
considered only nationality as a singular representation of
culture. For example, we were able to hypothesize about why we
observe variations by nationality – a gap in prior cross-cultural
security work [50], [68] – and supports more concrete avenues
for future work: e.g., developing tools that specifically protect
users in censored countries from “Digital Graffiti Artists”, by
detecting a negative-sentiment post about a government leader
and requesting SMS-confirmation before posting.
We are not the first to propose consideration of cultural
dimensions [23]. Traditionally, dimensions such as collectivism
or masculinity were used to fully represent a particular culture,
and this approach has been reasonably, questioned [71]. We
agree that dimensions cannot offer a full picture of culture.
However, we do suggest that consideration of domain-specific
dimensions (e.g., censorship, penetration) can be a valuable
part of cross-cultural security work. As such, developing a
taxonomy of cultural dimensions relevant to security may be a
fruitful direction for future work.
Moving forward, our results suggest an increased need for
cross-cultural work. As aforementioned, combining results
of prior, U.S. studies of incident response with our own
cross-cultural work allowed us to enrich our understanding of
user threats and discover new, relevant security factors. That
said, we acknowledge that cross-cultural work can be quite
difficult or, at times, infeasible due to monetary limitations
or other restrictions. In these cases, we encourage appropriate
description of the generalizability of the results and support for
cultural-expansion studies that replicate existing study designs
on participants from different cultural or geographic contexts.
III. METHODOLOGY
To investigate the process of in the wild security incident
response, we conducted 15 pilot interviews and 67 non-pilot
interviews with Facebook users from Brazil (BR), Germany
(DE), India (IN), the United States (US), and Vietnam (VN)
who had been notified of a real suspicious login incident on
their Facebook account during August 2017. Our research
procedures were approved through our ethics review process.
Here, we describe our sampling and recruitment methodol-
ogy, interview process, data analysis and validation procedure,
and the limitations of our work.
A. Sampling and Recruitment
To maximize ecological validity and minimize self-report
biases that may be introduced if we were to identify eligible
participants by asking people to report whether they had
experienced a particular incident 3 we consulted anonymized
Facebook log records to identify people whose accounts
had a suspicious login incident. To ensure comparability of
data across participants and countries we sought to recruit
people who had experienced the same type of account security
incident during the same time period (two weeks). Suspicious
login incidents are identified by Facebook machine learning
systems that monitor for deviations from typical login patterns.
Specifically, we selected only those accounts for which the
classifier was most confident that the suspicious login incident
was authentic (not caused by some non-malicious owner
action). Facebook users who have a suspicious login (which
the classifier may have predicted with variable confidence)
to their account are blocked from logging in (or continuing
account use) with a message that notifies them of the suspicious
login. The user must then immediately complete a secondary
authentication process (Figure 1) to regain access to their
account. Secondary authentication requires users to complete
one of a set of possible tasks, for example, identifying pictures
of their friends, identifying people with whom they have
recently messaged on Facebook messenger, or using two-factor
authentication if it is enabled.
3Prior work shows that people with different socioeconomic backgrounds
report security and privacy incidents at very different rates [24].
Fig. 1. (Left) The screen notifying users that a suspicious login has occurred.
When available this screen includes information about the geographic location
of the login. (Right) The screen in which participants can chose which
secondary authentication task to complete.
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Fig. 2. Internet penetration [25], Internet freedom [26], and Individualism [27],
[28], for each of the five countries from which we recruited interview
participants. Metrics are normalized such that a lower score indicates less
penetration, less freedom, and less emphasis on the individual (collectivism).
We specifically sought to study participants from five
different countries, each with a different cultural and tech-
nological profile, to maximize generalizability. We selected
Brazil, Germany, India, the US, and Vietnam as these countries
span four different continents and differ in Internet penetration,
Internet freedom, Facebook adoption level and incidence of
suspicious account logins4, as well as cultural characteristics
such as emphasis on the individual vs. the collective (e.g.,
collectivism), as shown in Figure 2.
Of our eligible participant sample, we identified those whose
account geolocation data indicated that they were within 100
miles of one of our interview locations, who had an email
address registered on Facebook, and who had not previously
opted out of being contacted about research via this email
address. We selected two interview locations per country: one
in a major city (e.g., New York City) and one in a small town
one to two hours from that city, in order to ensure a diversity
of participants. As we sought to recruit 75 participants in five
countries (Brazil, Germany, India, Vietnam, and the US) and
time zones, we made eligible for an interview anyone who had
experienced an account security incident in the two weeks prior
to the first interview day for their country. There were two
consecutive days of interviews for each country; all interviews
4We are not able to disclose these adoption and incidence figures.
were conducted within a two week period.
We contacted eligible participants via the email associated
with their account. Recruitment emails were sent from Facebook
email addresses using a Facebook letterhead to indicate
authenticity; all emails were translated into the participants’
locale (location-based language). The email explained how their
contact information was obtained, that a team of researchers
was conducting a study of people’s experiences on Facebook,
and that they were eligible for the study if they were interested
in participating. The email noted the study method (in-person
interviews), length (30 minutes), and compensation ($75 5
or equivalent). Those who were interested in participating
completed a short demographic and scheduling survey.6 We
selected participants in an attempt to maximize diversity in
terms of gender (M/F), age, and educational attainment.
B. Interview Protocol
At the beginning of the interview participants were reassured
that there were no right or wrong answers and that the
moderator was just interested in their opinions. Participants
were asked about what they typically do on Facebook. Then,
they were asked whether they remembered anything happening
recently that was out of the ordinary when they were logging
into their account or trying to use it. If they did not immediately
recall the incident the interviewer asked if they happened to
have done something like the secondary login process that we
knew they had completed. After this prompting, all participants
remembered the incident.
Incident Walkthrough. The participant was then asked to
tell the moderator about what had happened. The moderator
then paused, and explained to the participant that the moderator
was going to draw a timeline on a piece of paper, to make sure
they captured what the participant was saying. The moderator
drew a line and placed the notification in the middle, they then
added any events already described by the participant (e.g.,
behaviors afterwards, feelings at the time) and confirmed that
these were accurate with the participant. See Figure 4 for an
example.
Moderators then queried respondents’:
• feelings: about the experience (at the time of the notifica-
tion and at the time of the interview)
• mental models: what they think happened and why, and
how they figured it out
• incident response: what they did during and after see-
ing the notification, including security behaviors (e.g.,
changing password) and information seeking
Interview questions were asked in different order depending on
the way that participants initially described their experience, in
5Compensation for interviews conducted by UX consultancy firms such as
those used to schedule and interview participants in this study is typically
higher than for academic interviews, especially in studies such as ours where
study requirements make scheduling very tight – e.g., we wanted to conduct
15 interviews within two synchronous days.
6Scheduled participants completed a consent form prior to attending their
interview. There was no penalty for opting out, and record of their choice
to opt in or out was not associated with their Facebook account unless they
requested not to ever be contacted for Facebook studies.
order to create as natural and conversational a flow as possible.
Relevant information from participant’s answers was iteratively
added to the incident timeline.
Threat Model Assessment. Finally, if not already men-
tioned, the moderator asked participants to detail who they
would be most worried about gaining access to their account
(e.g., friend, stranger) and why (e.g., what they would be
concerned about this person doing or accessing).
C. Interview Process
The interviews were conducted in the country’s official
language. That is, US interviews were conducted in English,
German interviews in German, Indian interviews in Hindi,
Vietnam interviews in Vietnamese, and Brazilian interviews in
Portuguese. To enhance consistency, all interviews, including
those conducted in the US were completed by highly trained
moderators who spoke both English and the native language
of the country fluently.
Moderator Training and Interview Consistency. After
developing the interview protocol, the researchers tested the
interview protocol through 10 pilot interviews with U.S.
participants and iteratively improved the protocol until it
was consistently understood by participants and new issues
stopped emerging. The researchers then distributed the final
interview protocol to the moderators in each country as
well as to an interview training manager who had extensive
experience ensuring consistency across multi-country, multi-
language interview studies. All moderators had at least three
years of experience conducting UX research interviews in the
country native language. To ensure that the protocol would be
implemented as consistently and accurately as possible between
moderators, a three-step, moderator training and validation
process was conducted.
First, the researchers met with the interview training manager
and talked through the goals for the protocol.
Once the researchers were satisfied that the interview training
manager fully understood the protocol and would conduct
interviews in a comparable manner, the interview training
manager then repeated this process with each of the country
interview moderators. The interview manager also conducted
a test interview with each moderator in the role of interviewer,
and the manager in the role of participant. After the interview
training manager was satisfied with the moderators ability
to comparably conduct interviews according to the protocol,
the researchers met with each moderator and reviewed their
understanding of the interview protocol and method of asking
questions, providing additional feedback until all moderators
were well prepared.
Finally, the first interview of the first day of each of the
country interview sessions was treated as a pilot interview.
This pilot interview was simultaneously translated. Both the
researchers and the interview training manager listened to the
interviews and provided feedback to the moderator immediately
following the session and before the start of the non-pilot
interviews that were ultimately analyzed. All pilot interviews
met our standards for consistency and quality, and thus we
proceeded with the non-pilot interviews, as planned.
D. Data Analysis and Validation
Interview recordings were transcribed and translated into
English. We then analyzed the interview data, including the
timelines, via a qualitative open-coding process [29]. Two
researchers first reviewed seven of the transcripts and iteratively
generated a codebook. They then independently coded the
remaining 60 interview transcripts and timelines; and compared
their codes using Krippendorff’s alpha, the recommended
metric for checking the validity of qualitative interview coding.
The Krippendorff’s alpha of this study is 0.87, which is above
the required threshold of validity [30]. Further, after calculating
the agreement metric, the interviewers reached 100% agreement
on the final codes for each interview. In the results, we state
the number of participants who expressed each theme, rather
than using percentage values, to avoid over-implication of
generalizability.
Data Validation. During the interviews, participants often
attributed receiving the account security notification to a
particular action taken by themselves (e.g., logging in from a
new device) or by someone else (e.g., an attempted “hack”).
Unfortunately, while Facebook classifiers can predict a potential
unauthorized access with existing technology it is difficult to
validate the accuracy of those predictions, aside from using
user self reports. As such, we cannot use log data to validate
whether participants’ mental models (including their timelines
reflecting back on what may have caused the incident) were
accurate. However, we were able to use internal log records
to validate the completion of some behaviors users reported
doing after the incident. Specifically, we could validate whether
they actually changed their password or their privacy / security
settings. We found that, of the 14 participants who reported
doing so, 12 actually had done so, and one of the two who had
not had done so four weeks prior to the incident, and thus may
have experienced telescoping bias, in which participants may
perceive older events as being more recent than they really
are [31]. Our finding: that 12 of 14 reports were perfectly
accurate offers support for the credibility of our data, and
evidence in confirmation of the validity of security interview
data, at least when collected soon after a security incident.
E. Sample Descriptives
We had 15 non-pilot participants in Brazil, 11 in Germany,
15 in India, 17 in Vietnam, and 9 in the US. In all countries we
aimed to recruit 15 participants, in order to achieve sample sizes
within best-practice recommendations for qualitative research.
Table I shows the demographics of our participants.
F. Limitations
While we attempted to obtain a sample in each country that
was demographically diverse in terms of gender, education,
and age, we were unable to do so in India and Vietnam. We
hypothesize that this is due to cultural norms around gender
in both countries. In the future, we would recommend that
TABLE I
PARTICIPANT DEMOGRAPHICS
Gender Education1 Age2 FB Use3
BR 8M/7F 9PS/6HS 10M/5X/0B 14V/10F/7M/3B
DE 6M/5F 5PS/6HS 3M/7X/1B 9V/12F/4M/3B
IN 14M/1F 11PS/4HS 14M/1X/0B 9V/8F/4M/3B
US 4M/5F 3PS/6HS 4M/4X/1B 13V/5F/9M/1B
VN 12M/5F 7PS/10HS 14M/3X/0B 12V/8F/8M/7B
1 PS: post-secondary education (some college or above), HS: high
school diploma or less education
2 M: post-Millennial and Millennial [32] (ages 18-37), X: Gen X
(ages 38-54), and B: Baby Boomer (ages 55+)
3 Using Facebook to V: view content (passive), F: connect with
friends, M: Facebook Messenger, and B: run a business.
in-person interview studies seeking to recruit women in places
with these norms should consider in-house interviews, rather
than office-based interviews. Further, researchers should remain
open to a potential need for snowball sampling to obtain an
appropriate sample.
We also did not achieve our goal sample size in Germany
and the U.S., partially due to weather issues in the US (heavy
storms) and lower incident incidence rates. We did however
reach theme saturation in each country, typically after seven
interviews. Further, prior work has most thoroughly studied
security in Western countries, as such, we acknowledge this
limitation in our work, but believe it does not undermine the
final, qualitative results.
Additionally, we examined a single type of account security
incident that occurred naturally on a single platform: Facebook.
While Facebook is heavily adopted, we cannot necessarily
generalize our findings to all other types of accounts or
incidents (e.g., phishing). We encourage future work evaluating
and expanding the process model we define to include other
incidents and platforms. Like most self-report studies, we can-
not validate the accuracy of participant’s responses. However,
we know for certain from log data that our participants all
experienced a notification about an account security incident.
Additionally, we validate the behavioral reports, where possible,
a first to our knowledge in interview studies; the high validity
level of the reports (Section III-D) supports the integrity of
our interview data. Finally, participants knew that this research
was being conducted by Facebook, and this knowledge may
have biased their answers. To mitigate this effect, none of the
interviews were conducted by Facebook employees, and, at
the beginning of the interview, participants were told that the
interviewer was not from Facebook and that the interviewer
wanted to hear anything – good or bad – about the participants’
experiences. Further, the participant was reassured that their
answers would never be associated with their Facebook account
and would have no effect on their Facebook account.
IV. ACCOUNT SECURITY INCIDENT RESPONSE PROCESS
Our interview analysis revealed a common process of account
security incident response across our 67 participants. The
process consists of three main steps: becoming aware of the
incident, causal attribution (developing a mental model of
Fig. 3. Process diagram illustrating the generalized process of account security incident response we observed across our 67 participants. The rectangles
represent inputs or outputs (e.g., the notification message, the cause of the incident, a particular behavioral response), the diamonds represent a user-driven
process (e.g., decision-making, information seeking), and the hexagons represent influencing factors (e.g., past experiences).
the incident), and behavioral response (e.g., changing their
password on Facebook, changing their password on other
websites). The decisions users make in each step of the process
are influenced by external information – that they may seek out
at each step – as well as their past experiences, threat models,
and cultural contexts. In this section we describe this process,
summarized in Figure 3. In Section V we explore how the
information-seeking practices we observe differ from general
security advice-seeking practices studied in prior work; and in
Section VI we discuss the influence of cultural context on both
the response process and the information seeking sub-process.
A. Incident Awareness
The incident response process begins with the user gaining
awareness that an incident has occurred. This is done through
a message (Figure 1) informing the user that a suspicious login
has occurred. After seeing this message, users are required to
complete a secondary login process, which users must complete
to regain access to their Facebook account. Participants were
offered a choice of secondary authentication options, such as
identifying pictures of their friends, identifying people they
had recently messaged, or two-factor authentication (Figure 1).
Awareness is triggered by the unique authentication
process more often than by the notification message itself.
The majority of participants (48 of 67) did not describe
becoming aware of the incident from the notification message,
but rather described that their awareness of the incident was
triggered when confronted with the secondary authentication
task. For example, VN12 describes how they learned about
the recent incident with no mention of the initial notification
message: “it asked me to log in again and asked me to identify
friends...so I knew something was wrong, it had said something
about suspicious login to my account.” As exemplified by this
quote, once attention was captured participants then reflected
on what the notification message had actually said.
We hypothesize that users may be so habituated to all types
of “warning” messages, as has been shown in a plethora of
other work on SSL warnings [1], [2], that they simply click
through the message and their attention is only captured when
they must perform a task. Our findings parallel findings that
SSL warnings were more effective (able to combat habituation)
when people had to take an action (e.g., highlight text) in order
to proceed. This suggests that, when merited, incident secondary
authentication tasks as part of the notification process may be
effective and beneficial for both users and platforms; perhaps
more so than warning messages or more stringent security
requirements, both of which may be met with user resistance
and negative platform sentiment [13]. That said, platforms must
be careful of over-acting “security theater” [33] and causing
users to feel a false sense of safety, which may reduce their
likelihood of protecting themselves when necessary.
The remaining minority of participants became alert to
the potential incident from the notification message itself.
For example, BR14 noticed the message and the information
described peaked their attention, “Facebook said that there was
someone in Brasilia [a different city in Brazil] trying to access
my account, and I was at home, so [I thought]...that can’t be
right.” Throughout the remainder of the paper we use the term
“notification” to refer to whichever portion of the notification
flow participants referenced as what alerted them that there
was potentially something wrong with their account.
Respondents felt surprised, fearful, and/or annoyed.
Some participants were surprised (8 of 67) when alerted to the
incident. They expressed a lack of awareness that Facebook
conducted these types of “checks”: US1 says, “I was surprised
at first just because I had never seen that specific type of check
before. Maybe I see like emails or something but I had never
seen that before from Facebook.”
17 participants expressed fear in response to the notification
for one (or both) of two reasons. Eleven participants felt
afraid because they feared that someone had gained access
to the account. These participants went through the mental
modeling process immediately upon gaining awareness and
swiftly concluded that the incident was caused by an attacker.
On the other hand, eight of the 17 were afraid they would
not be able to complete the secondary authentication process
and regain access to their account; these participants were
concerned with how they would get back into their account
before being concerned about why or what had happened. IN6
for example says “I was afraid, what if I don’t know the
comments [that I have to identify], and I lose my account?
That’s the only place I can run my business”. Three of the
eight participants who had this concern did, in fact, need to
attempt more than one secondary login task before successfully
completing one task and regaining access to their account.
Finally, annoyance was only observed among 14 participants
who received the notifications frequently, the majority of whom
concluded that the notifications were due to routine Internet
use (Section IV-B provides more detail on the mental models
of these participants). Our findings echo prior work showing
that repeated warnings elicit annoyance [3], [34], while account
hijacking incidents may elicit fear [35].
Secondary login process can create a sense of partner-
ship. Many participants felt positively about the fact that they
were alerted to an incident. A total of 32 participants felt
positively about the notification, eight participants also had
other emotions such as fear, surprise or annoyance while the
remainder felt only positively. These participants perceived
the notification process as a form of active partnership with
the platform: Facebook was watching out for threats to their
account and they as the user were completing a task (the
secondary authentication task) to help Facebook keep them
secure. BR11 explains that now that she knew Facebook was
“on my side” and that “I don’t think anyone else could do
[the secondary authentication task], I felt safe after [that]”.
Similarly, DE1 says, “it made me feel like...[Facebook] is on
top of the game...somebody is watching out to make sure I don’t
get hacked” and DE3 says that now that he knows about the
notification process and has done the secondary authentication
task, “I feel much safer about my account.” The fact that
participants felt that the secondary task they had to complete
was secure - the vast majority (46 of 67) trusted the method
of secondary authentication “it seemed much safer than those
security questions” (US5) - appears to further enhance this
sense of partnership. This finding expands on prior findings,
which considered multiple platforms, and showed that password
reuse notifications made users feel safe [36].
A few respondents sought out information about authen-
ticity. This sense of partnership clearly relies on participants
believing that the notification and task were actually from
Facebook. While the majority of respondents immediately
trusted the notification and/or secondary authentication task, a
TABLE II
INCIDENT MENTAL MODELS
“Something I did” (False Positive)
• Because I logged in from new location 9
• Because I was doing something unsafe or not allowed 9
• Because I used a new or rarely-used device 7
• Because I mistyped my password 4
• Because I use a VPN or private browsing 6
“An Attack” (True Positive)
• By someone I don’t know (Unknown Attacker) 10
• By someone I know (Known Attacker) 13
• By either a known or unknown attacker 8
“Random Selection”
• Random security check (“like TSA”) 4
• New security measure for everyone 3
few wondered – is this notification malicious? – that is, they
sought out information about the authenticity of the notification.
DE7 said “At first, I thought, maybe this is someone trying to
hack me, to find out about my friends. I’ve never seen this on
Facebook before, maybe it got hacked. So then I looked it up
and found a page from Facebook explaining what this is.” Five
of 67 participants (four of whom expressed surprise in reaction
to the notification) sought out information about message
authenticity; and three other participants raised authenticity
concerns, but “trusted that [the notification] was probably ok”
(IN6) and completed the secondary authentication process
without seeking out additional information about authenticity.
The fact that these concerns were raised by eight participants
is, in fact, encouraging: users are thinking critically about what
information is being asked of them. This also underscores the
importance of having easily accessible information (e.g., the
Facebook help page [37] that DE7 consulted) that people can
use to verify notification authenticity.
B. Mental Model Generation
Participants try to develop a mental model – a rough internal
representation of how something happened or how something
works – of the incident either while being notified (after gaining
awareness of the incident, but before regaining access to their
account) or after they have regained access to their account, but
before taking a protective behavior to prevent future incidents.
Participants identify one of three possible causes for the
incident: something they did, an attacker attempting to
gain access, or “random selection” by Facebook. Overall,
29 of our participants thought the incident about which they
were being notified was caused by something they did (i.e.,
they thought the incident notification was a false positive),
while 31 thought the incident was caused by an attacker
(i.e., a true positive), and 7 did not associate the incident
with anything about their account, but rather thought that the
notification / secondary authentication task was either randomly
assigned or assigned to all Facebook users (an inaccurate
mental model). As discussed below, some participants reached
multiple conclusions about the cause of the incident, within
these broader categories (Table II).
Of those who thought that the incident was caused by
something they did, they attributed the notification to logging
in from a new geographic location, logging in on a new device
(or from multiple devices), mistyping their password, or using
VPN or private browsing mode. Specifically, nine participants
attributed the suspicious login notification to logging in from a
new location. For example, BR12 says “Yeah, it’s because...it
seemed that I logged in from another country. So it appeared to
Facebook that there was a suspicious access.” Seven participants
thought that the incident was caused by using a new device,
or multiple devices. An additional four participants thought
that the incident was caused by mistyping their password,
sometimes repeatedly: “well, I reset my password like four
months ago and then I forgot that I did that, so I just retyped my
old password like 10 times, and then it happened,” reported IN9.
Finally, six participants thought that the notification appeared
because they sometimes used a VPN or private browsing mode
on their browser to access Facebook.
Finally, nine participants thought that the incident was
caused by doing something “bad”: doing something insecure
or something of which the platform would disapprove. For
example, DE1 says: “I thought about it that maybe I did
something wrong. Did I click on a link or did I get an email?”
VN1 attributed the account security incident to having done
something that Facebook would not approve of the night before
he received the notification: “I hacked likes. So basically, I
just hacked number of likes on the post,” which VN1 explains
means that they ran a scheme with their friends to all like each
other’s posts. He explained that because Facebook had figured
out he was doing this, they probably made him do this extra
login procedure. In reality, these nine users were incorrect, as,
while Facebook does also have processes to protect users from
spam and malicious actors, those processes would not have
resulted in a suspicious login notification.
Seven participants had a variety of less accurate mental
models, all of which illustrated a misperception of the incident.
Four of these participants thought that the notification and
secondary authentication task was “a random security check,
like TSA does at the airport” (US2) or that Facebook was
performing “like a checkup to make sure [the] account was ok”
(BR7). The remaining three believed that the notification and
secondary authentication task was given to all Facebook users,
potentially to increase Facebook’a reputation or to counteract
a current issue, like Fake News. For example, IN4 says “I hear
about fake news a lot...So, I just merely think that they are
cracking down or something, and everyone had to do this extra
thing, that’s what I thought.”
General threat models influence incident-specific under-
standings. For those participants (31 of 67) who thought the
incident was caused by someone trying to gain access to their
account, their conception of what was happening drew heavily
on their general threat model for their Facebook account. In
general, participants threat models for their Facebook accounts
consisted of (a) who they were worried about gaining access
to the account and (b) what they were worried about an
attacker accessing. Across all participants, 25 were concerned
about unknown attackers, 19 about known attackers, and the
remaining 23 about both. Of the 31 participants who thought
this specific incident was caused by an attacker, 10 thought that
an unknown attacker was attempting to gain access, 13 thought
that it was a known attacker, and 8 mentioned both types of
attackers – each of these conceptions was in line with their
general mental model. That is, if they were generally concerned
about an unknown attacker and they thought that this incident
was caused by an attacker, rather than e.g., something they did,
they thought that the attacker was unknown to them. Similarly,
those general Facebook threat models centered around someone
they knew (a known attacker) gaining access to their account
and who thought that this specific incident was caused by
an attacker, attributed the incident to a particular person they
knew: “I have been going through a breakup and he’s real
savvy with devices...I think it was him” (VN3).
Participants whose threat models centered around unknown
attackers –“someone bad trying to get in” (US6) – expressed
conceptions of these attackers that fell broadly into the theo-
retical framework previously defined by Wash [18]: unknown
attackers were viewed as either “digital graffiti artists” – who
gain access to accounts in order to show off – or “burglars”
– who gain access to accounts for the purpose of theft. On
the other hand, those whose threat models centered around
a known attacker had a broader set of mental models. While
some conceived of their known attackers in the ways proposed
by Wash’s existing framework – as “digital graffiti artists”
and “burglars” – others participants described a broader, new
taxonomy of known attacker folk models:
• the Spy: Some participants expressed concern that some-
one they knew would attempt to gain access to their
account in order to provide information to the government
about them (e.g., information obtained by reading their
private messages, or information about their business).
For example VN10 describes a conversation with a
“hacker” friend who he knows provides information to
the government: “I mentioned about this situation [to my
friend]...my friend said that I should talk to this other
hacker and show this code and tell that I am this person,
I’m his friend...and then this other hacker said he was
sorry and stopped doing that.” The legitimacy of this threat
model is supported by reports of government attacks [38].
• the Snoop: Other participants expressed concern that
someone they knew would want gossip or to know
something private about them, not something that was
financially valuable, but something personal (e.g., how
a romantic relationship was going). BR12 suspected her
best friend of snooping, she says “My best friend, why
would she have done this? She should have asked me, I
would have given her permission or told her.”
• the Who Else: In an variation on the “Big Fish” model [18],
some participants explained that they could not understand
how an unknown person could gain access to their account
without knowing them – nor why they would want access –
and therefore concluded that the attacker must be someone
they know. IN3 explains: “It is totally impossible that
[an unknown person] gets my account, or he wants my
account, he can’t get into my account because he is totally
unknown and he doesn’t know anything about me.”
• the Humiliator: Finally, participants thought that someone
they knew might want to access their account to humiliate
them: “if he just did it for fun, or to show me he could,
that’s ok. But if it’s not just for fun, then I’m afraid
that he would...upload photos or videos to humiliate me.”
(VN13) This is an expansion of the “Digital Graffiti Artist”
model [18], where users are ok with someone they know
doing some types of “graffiti” (e.g., unauthorized posting)
but not others (e.g., humiliation).
Of the 19 participants who were concerned about known
attackers, their conception of these known attackers was rela-
tively equally distributed across this taxonomy of motivations,
suggesting that participants are not merely trying to explain
away notifications (e.g., the Who Else model) but are genuinely
concerned about attacks from those they know.
Finally, participants’ mental models concern not only who
is attacking them but nature of the attack: 46 participants were
worried about someone acting as them on their profile, 26
were worried about someone accessing their messages, 23
were worried about someone getting hold of their PII or their
pictures, respectively, and 10 were concerned about financial
loss or being reported to the government, respectively. These
concerns informed participants mental models of why the
attacker was attempting to gain access and thus influenced
whether participants chose to take protective action after
regaining access to their accounts, and which actions they
took, as described in Section IV-C.
Past experiences with similar incidents may reduce
perception of threat. Participants who reported having seen
a similar incident notification on Facebook in the past (14
participants) often reported a shift in their mental model of the
incidents over time: while at first they thought that an attacker
was attempting to gain access, after repeated checkpoints they
started viewing the incidents as “routine” (DE5). DE2 explains,
“the first time, I was worried...[now I understand] Facebook
asks all users this when they go into a foreign country [now] I
don’t think it has to do with me.” Similarly, VN6 explains that
she was originally concerned for her account, but subsequent
checkpoints made her think that this was just a routine security
check: “The first time that it appeared, I thought it was someone
who was trying to access to my Facebook but the next times, I
realized that it was Facebook [trying] to enhance the security.”
Thus, multiple notifications are a signal to users that the system
may be generating false positive reports. Some participants
may indeed see the incident notifications frequently due to
false positives – e.g., caused by use of privacy enhancing
technologies (VPN, private browsing) [39] or frequent travel or
multiple device use, for example, VN12 explains, “Because I
have like two accounts. I have never encountered such problem
with one account, but with the other account, I always encounter
that problem. Because I only use one account on laptop,
so that thing has never happened. I have never encountered
such request. But with the other account, I use it on various
computers, so that?s why it always requests to verify if that
was me.” However, this does not mean that an authentic threat
cannot also occur, even after prior false positives.
Participants only mention past experiences with Face-
book, not other platforms. It is interesting to note that
experiences on other platforms did not appear to influence
mental models of the incidents we studied. In fact, no
participants mentioned similar experiences on other platforms,
they only referenced prior experiences on Facebook. This is
perhaps surprising, as prior work has suggested that negative
experiences, or stories about those experiences, can generally
inform users’ security posture. We hypothesize that this may
have occurred for two reasons. First, our incidents are not
precisely negative experiences but rather prevented negative
experiences, which are perhaps less powerful. Second, most
participants considered the secondary authentication process
quite unique – as DE1 explains, “there is no other provider
doing this type of authorization” – it is thus possible that
the uniqueness of the secondary authentication task may have
prevented generalization from other prior experiences. Our
findings thus raise questions about what precise types of
negative experiences generalize across platforms, and the level
of similarity between experiences required to allow users to
make connections, whether positive – behavior transfer – or
negative – fatigue transfer – between them.
Participants may reach out for support as part of the
process of mental modeling. In addition to drawing on
their own understandings and past experiences to form their
incident mental models, 17 participants sought out additional
information to help them understand the incident. They sought
information about causation: “I wanted to know, why is this
happening? What happened to my account?” (VN2). The
information they collected, either from other people or through
online sources (how people sought out information is discussed
in more detail in Section V) influenced the cause they ultimately
attributed to the incident and whether, and what, protective
behavior they took. For example, US7 says, “well, I searched
on Google, and it said that sometimes there are these people
online, and they just try getting into a bunch of accounts. And
so I thought wow, that’s probably what’s happening here...At
first I thought it was no big deal, but then after reading that, I
thought, wow, I should probably do something about that.”
Despite the majority reaching plausible mental models,
many oscillated between multiple possible models. Finally,
the mental models that many participants developed through
their process of causal reasoning were what we characterize as
weak. That is, of the 51 participants who had plausible mental
models of the incident (that it as caused by something they
did or by an attacker), 27 offered up multiple possible models
or hypothetical causes for the incident, or repeatedly caveated
the mental model they described with “I don’t know” or other
statements of low confidence. For example, US4 provides a
hypothesis for why they saw the notification but notes they
are not too sure they are correct, “I think, maybe they see I’m
logging in two locations, I don’t know, honestly, but I just go
Fig. 4. BR4 experienced the incident while using wifi at home. He thought
that the incident was caused by someone trying to hack his account, but
reached out to friends before completing the secondary login task to double
check if they had ever experienced something similar. After completing the
secondary authentication task, he checked his security settings for changes and
then changed all of his passwords on both Facebook and his other social media
accounts. He expressed that he was afraid when he thought his account was
hacked, especially since 2 years ago he had lost access to a previous Facebook
account. He also mentioned that he wished there had been information about
what happened to his account in the notification, and that it would be cool if
facial recognition was an option for a secondary authentication task.
on with it.” Similarly, some participants, like IN11, offered
multiple possible explanations for what happened “Well, my
thought is that maybe I have accessed my Facebook account...
either from an unsecured line. Or I might have shared certain
things, which I shouldn’t have done. Or I shared some certain
details to my friends and colleagues and they try to check the
account from a different location or something like that.” As
described further in the next section, these oscillations led to
uncertainty about what to do next.
C. Behavioral Response
Ultimately the mental model that participants generated about
the incident informed their behavioral response: whether and
what behavior to take to proactively secure their accounts and
attempt to prevent future incidents. Participants who felt that
an attacker had gained access to their account changed their
password, while those who thought the notification was a false
positive (e.g., because they were traveling) tended not to take
any action. It is important to note that platforms are only
able to predict that a suspicious login is legitimately an attack
with some level of confidence: once informed, users similarly
make their own prediction (or mental model), again with some
confidence, about whether the incident is really an attack. Thus,
lack of protective behavior is not necessarily a failing on the
part of the participants. That said, the incidents about which
participants in this study were notified were predicted to be
authentic with the highest level of classifier confidence, while
only a little over a third of users in our study, 24 participants,
took a protective action. The majority (21 of 31) of the users
who had a true-positive mental model took a protective action
or checked for evidence of tampering, and a few (3 of 21) of
the participants with weak mental models that centered around
assuming the incident was a false positive, and who had not
received notifications repeatedly, also took a protective action
or checked their accounts.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, those participants with inaccurate
mental models (e.g., those who thought that they had received
the notification because of behavior the platform disapproved
or that the incident was a “random security check”) were
less likely to take effective action (e.g., they would avoid
liking posts) or any action at all. In fact, every participant who
thought that they were selected randomly, or that everyone
experienced the same incident on Facebook did not engage
in a post-incident behavior. Those with weak mental models
either chose multiple behaviors (a minority: 6 of 27) or did
nothing at all (the remainder). For example, VN13 had a
weak mental model consisting of multiple hypotheses for
the incident. This led to confusion about what to do after
regaining access to his account: “I don’t really know [which
one happened]...and now what to do? I don’t know” (VN13).
Finally, as aforementioned, 14 participants had experienced a
similar Facebook security notification repeatedly, which led
them to attribute the incident to something “routine” (DE5) that
they did and feel annoyed about being notified. Consequently,
none of these participants took a follow up action to further
protect their account. Exemplifying this phenomena of fatigue,
US3 says, “it’s just the same thing again, the only thing to do
would be to stop [using private browsing]”.
On-platform responses included changing passwords
and settings, behaving “better”, and checking accounts
for tampering. Twenty four of 67 respondents took an on-
platform action in response to the incident and eight checked
something (e.g., messages, settings) for evidence of tampering.
This behavior was typically taken before any off-platform
behavior.
On Facebook, nine participants changed their password
and five updated their privacy or security settings7, while 10
changed their behavior on Facebook. When updating privacy /
security settings, participants either added trusted contacts [40]
to their account, set up two factor authentication, or set up SMS
notifications of suspicious events. Of the latter, IN13 explains
that setting up SMS notifications will keep their account more
secure, because they will be able to complete the secondary
authentication process immediately: “now I put in my cellphone
[number so] that I should receive alerts if someone tries logging
into my Facebook account...so it won’t be a surprise and I can
kick them out right then.” BR4 mentions changing his security
settings to make sure his pictures were not publicly visible. He
explains, “if they’re using those to protect my account, what
good is it if everyone sees them?” (Figure 4 contains the full
timeline of BR4’s incident experience).
7Participants used the terms “privacy settings” and “security settings”
interchangeably, so we do not distinguish in our analysis. In almost all cases,
they were consulting the security settings page.
Those who changed their behavior on Facebook took a
variety of different efforts to behave in ways they perceived
as more safe or more approved by the platform. IN2 says “I
actually stopped adding strangers in my friend list and also
stopped commenting on strangers’ posts,” because he associated
these behaviors as “unsafe” and likely to have led to an attacker
gaining access to his account (and thus, causing the notification).
Similarly, VN4 says “Now I would not click on something
that is unclear, [like] sometimes I was tagged by my friends
in some apps and auto comments, so [now], I will stay away
from them. I will just click on the thing that I know, but for
things that I don’t know, I won’t click them.” Of the ten users
who started avoiding certain behaviors, six had attributed the
incident to having done something “bad”, the other four had
weak mental models and did multiple behaviors “just in case”
(IN2). Participants also checked their Facebook accounts for
tampering. Of those who did so, six checked their messages to
see if any had been sent without their permission. For example,
IN3 says, “I checked the messages to see if there was anything
[sent] deceiving other friends.” 10 participants also checked
their Facebook timelines for content that they had not posted
or likes that they had not actioned; and five checked the Pages
they ran on Facebook to see if anything had been posted or
changed without their permission.
Off-platform behaviors aim to reduce risk of encoun-
tering the incident again, but sometimes through security-
compromising choices. A smaller portion, 11 respondents,
updated their off-platform security posture based on the
particular incident we studied. BR4 (Figure 4) not only adjusted
his security settings, but “also changed my password for other
things too.” While such adjustments may be positive, at times,
users learned less advantageous lessons. IN9 mentions that he
forgot his password and then, after repeatedly typing his old
password, encountered the notification and secondary login
process. To avoid this happening again he, “changed [his]
passwords on all my social media sites to be the same, so
I don’t forget”. Of the 11 respondents, it appears that three
improved their security posture (one started using a password
manager, two changed their passwords on other accounts to
novel passwords), four made potentially less secure changes
(saving passwords in browser, avoiding using VPN, using more
similar or simpler passwords), and the remaining five made
vague effort to be safer or more vigilant: e.g., “I’m more careful
on email [now] too” (US5).
Behavioral response is not always immediate. For exam-
ple, IN4 says “The second time [I got a notification]...I was
worried that I had been hacked...so now I have changed my
password [and set my] privacy settings [to] very highly private.
So, I am not worried now.” While going through the notification
once did not worry him, going through a second time did, and
he subsequently decided to take action. Similarly, DE3 searched
the Internet for information about the incident a few days after
it occurred, deciding to change her password because “the
articles I saw seemed to say it was likely someone really was
trying to get in and recommended changing the password.”
Behavioral response was also informed through informa-
tion seeking. Seven participants in addition to DE3 sought
out information about behavior: what to do after regaining
access to their accounts. US3 says “it wasn’t clear if I was
supposed to do something else or just go back to using the
account...so I asked around to my friends about it”. Four of the
eight participants who sought advice on behavior concluded
that they should change their passwords, while two decided
from the information they collected that they did not need to
take any further action. The remaining participant was told
“my friend, he said, just be alert for the next few days, in case
anything weird goes on in the account” (IN12). Of these eight
participants, all but one had what we characterize as weak
mental models. They used outside information to bolster their
understanding of what to do about what happened, even if they
were still uncertain about the incident cause.
V. INCIDENT-RESPONSE INFORMATION SEEKING
As described in the prior section, participants sought out
information about authenticity, causation, and/or behavior at
different points in the response process. In this section we
discuss how they sought information and their overarching
motivation for doing so. We place these findings in the
context of prior work on general security advice-seeking and
consequently show that incident-response information is unique
from general digital security information-seeking in the sources
of support used, the urgency of seeking support, and motivations
for seeking support.
Sources of support and urgency of support. A total of
23 participants sought out support during the incident response
process. They used three support channels: 16 participants
consulted informal sources (majority: family and friends),
seven searched online, and five consulted the Facebook help
pages (these five navigated directly to the Facebook help
center, without first searching the Internet in general). BR4,
for example, reached out to his friends. He thought that he
knew what had happened to his account, “I thought it had
been hacked” but wanted to see if “any of my friends had
experienced this, before doing something” (Figure 4 shows
his incident timeline). In contrast, prior work on support
sources for digital security or Internet use shows that people
often get advice about digital security through both informal
(family, friends) and formal sources (librarians, workplace
IT staff, paid support staff) [41]–[44]. However, none of our
participants sought information from a formal source and only
three mentioned consulting a particular friend or family member
because they were an expert. Additionally, again in contrast
to prior work [41], participants did not mention evaluating
the information they received (either from people or from
online sources) for quality. In the moment of incident response,
users may be searching urgently for information, preoccupied
with concern for their account rather than concern about the
legitimacy of information they find: IN14 says, “I tried to find
it online. [I googled] “Why is Facebook asking me to verify
my comments, ask me to change my password and my privacy
setting?” I just wanted to find out what was wrong, fast!”
Support facilitates camaraderie. In addition to eliciting in-
formation that augmented participants technical understanding
(authenticity, causation) and awareness of protective behaviors,
for 14 of the 23 participants who sought out information
seeking, this practice served to create a sense of camaraderie.
Illustrating this last point, IN4 says, “I asked my friends...I came
across 2 or 3 friends, they told me that their...accounts had been
hacked...So, I thought, ok it’s not just me.” Similarly, US7 says
“I wanted to find out if this was normal, like something other
people have had,” and BR4 says “Well I was at work and I asked
people there whether they have received anything like that,
they said no, so I was the only one that had experienced that.”
Pre-existing sense of camaraderie may also reduce motivation
to seek information during incident response: for example,
US4 says “I thought [the secondary authentication process]
happened sometimes with everyone so I didn’t discuss [or
seek out information].” Participant emphasis on camaraderie
may in part explain the prior success of using social influence
to encourage security and privacy behavior [45]. Finally, as
camaraderie is not a motivation uncovered in prior work on
general security information seeking, we hypothesize that
camaraderie may be most relevant to in-the-moment, responsive
security information-seeking such as that studied in this work.
Participants who avoid seeking out information during
or soon after an incident may consider the incident private
or embarrassing. Finally, those who consider account security
(or other security and privacy) incidents private may avoid
seeking out information. For example DE5 mentioned that
“I don’t like to share personal things. I don’t share anything
personal like this [incident] with anyone, including my wife.”
They may also avoid doing so because they view seeking
support as embarrassing: VN13 says, “I didn’t want to ask
anyone because it was embarrassing, like I didn’t know how
to use Facebook. So I just hoped I was doing [the right thing].”
11 of the 44 participants who did not seek out information
reported avoiding doing so because this was a private incident
(5 participants) or because looking for support would be
embarrassing (6 participants). These sentiments of privacy
and embarrassment around support have not been raised in
prior security advice research. The majority of the remaining
participants who did not seek out information had strong mental
models, or had been repeatedly notified of similar incidents on
the platform, and thus we hypothesize that they did not feel
that they needed additional information.
VI. INFLUENCE OF CULTURAL CONTEXT
The processes of incident response we define in the prior
sections was broadly consistent across participants from five
different countries with differing Internet and cultural contexts.
However, we find initial trends that culture influences more
latent components of users’ experiences, which in turn drive
different outcomes – in terms of information seeking and
protective behaviors – from this shared process.
Degree of Internet censorship in the participant’s country
appears to influence their threat models: all six of the par-
ticipants who described a government-related threat model
were from more censored countries, India and Vietnam. These
participants described “the Spy” threat model: that someone
they knew would gain access to their account and share
information with the government. Two of these participants
also worried that someone could use account access to publicly
disparage the government: “if my account gets hacked and
someone [says bad things about] prime minister Modi through
my account, then it’ll be a big problem for me. Maybe I’ll not
be able to stay in my country. That’s a big problem” (IN14).
Collectivist cultural identity appears to influence both
participants’ threat models and support sources. Participants
from more collectivistic cultures (Vietnam, Brazil, and India)
were more concerned about someone they knew gaining access
to their account than an unknown “hacker”. This finding
aligns with results from prior work on Internet purchasing
practices which showed significant differences in online risk
perception between individualist and collectivist cultures [46].
This emphasis on known attackers also led participants from
Brazil and Vietnam to express concern about feelings of
violation from account security incidents; these concerns were
not raised by any participants from the US or Germany. BR13
explains, “I would feel that someone was violating me. And
I wouldn’t know what to do because then I wouldn’t be able
to do anything to recover.” Among Brazilian participants, this
was, in fact, the second most-frequently mentioned concern
about someone gaining access to their account.
Those from more collectivistic countries in our sample
differed in their information sources: all but one of the
participants from Brazil, Vietnam, and India who sought out
information did so from a person. In contrast, those in the
US were split regarding seeking out information from online
sources vs. people, and only two participants in Germany
mentioned seeking out information at all, one from an online
search and one from a peer. Prior work has suggested that
those who rely on people they know well (e.g., friends, family)
have lower Internet skill than those who seek information
online [47]–[49]. However, our results preliminarily suggest
that collectivist identities, in addition to potential variance in
Internet skill due to recency of Internet adoption, may also
explain variance in security information seeking channels.
Differentiated platform use also influences threat models
among our participants, specifically regarding concerns about
account access. For example, 10 of 17 participants in Vietnam
used Facebook for business purposes compared to 2 of 11
participants in Germany, 1 of 9 in the US, 3 of 15 in India, and 3
of 15 in Brazil. Vietnamese participants describe threat models
that include being concerned about financial consequences from
someone accessing their Facebook account, far more than do
participants from other countries. For example, VN6 explains:
“My page has a few tens [of] thousands of likes...if that
admin’s right was stolen, then I can’t earn my living and they
could use it for bad purpose.” Similarly, fewer participants in
Germany and India – the two countries with fewest participants
using Facebook Messenger – mentioned being concerned about
someone gaining access to their messages.
Finally, prior cross-cultural work has focused quite broadly
on the effects of culture or has considered factors related to a
single cultural factor: Internet penetration and skill [50], [51].
While it is possible that differentiated platform use is related
to the recency of Internet adoption (or skill) of participants in
a certain country, we observe no country-based usage patterns
that indicate skill-based biases: for example, passive viewing
of content on Facebook is equally prevalent in the US as in
Brazil and Vietnam. Further, only six of 67 participants (from
four of five countries) mentioned “fear” of not being able to
complete the secondary authentication task, and no participants
mentioned not engaging in a particular behavioral response
due to concerns about skill / ability.
The lack of skill-related influence that we observe is likely
due to the fact that those in our sample were sufficiently skilled
with online tasks to schedule an interview with us and complete
a demographic survey, all online. While this limits our ability
to comment on the relevance of skill in the response process,
or the variance of skill by culture, it does allow us a unique
opportunity to take an initial look at the influence of other, more
sociological cultural factors (e.g., censorship, collectivism),
which may otherwise be overshadowed by differences in skill.
Further, it is encouraging that among our sample of users who
were all able to complete the same online task (scheduling
the interview): we do not observe country-level variance in
incident response-relevant skills.
VII. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
In this work, we inductively define a common process
of account security incident response through an in-depth
exploration of the experiences of users who had recently been
notified of an account security incident. In sum, the notification
process – particularly the use of the secondary authentication
task, which created a sense of platform-user partnership –
appears to be relatively effective both at alerting users to a
threat and facilitating security action, when appropriate.
While the incident notification process led to protective
behavior for a third of all participants, and for the majority
of those who thought the incident was a true positive, it was
far less effective among participants who had weak mental
models (e.g., those who were uncertain about what caused the
incident). While the majority (51) of participants established
plausible mental models for what had caused the incident,
nearly half of those with plausible models established multiple
plausible models – it could have been a true positive, e.g., my
brother trying to log in to my account, or a false positive, e.g.,
because I logged in from a new phone – and were undecided
between them. This lack of certainty regarding why the incident
had happened and whether it was legitimate resulted in a
lack of certainty about what to do next. While nine of these
participants reached out for support from others in these cases,
the notification itself was the primary source of information
for the remaining participants who had weak mental models.
Yet, notifications often lack key information – particularly,
information about the likelihood that this notification is inform-
ing the user of a legitimate threat. This lack of transparency
can reduce notification efficacy. For example, users in our study
who received repeated, frequent suspicious login notifications
tended to increasingly believe that the notifications were false
positives and that no protective action was needed. However,
even if a “more likely to be authentic” event suddenly occurs –
like the incidents examined in this study – participants may be
given no indication that this notification or incident is different
from prior, less risky incidents. Thus, they will likely not take
any protective action. Beyond the example we present here,
this phenomena has been echoed in work showing user fatigue
toward SSL warning notifications [5], [52].
Recent work has shown that providing more transparency
to users may help them make better decisions: a majority of
users are able to make “rational” decisions about security
when presented with concrete levels of hacking risk [72]
and prior work in other fields shows that more information
improves people’s decision making [73]–[75] and their trust
in algorithmic predictions [76]. Thus, we argue that using UI
indicators of classifier confidence in incident notifications may
help to re-capture participant attention in high-risk situations
and may help users make their own “classification” of the
incident about which they have been notified.
In addition to improving classifier transparency, we hy-
pothesize that incorporating user feedback into those security
classifiers may further improve accuracy. Recent work in
machine learning [77]–[79] has shown that integrating human
inputs can improve classification results. Human intuition and
knowledge – in the context of suspicious logins, information
about users’ threat models, past experiences, and offline
activities such as travel – could thus be used as additional
features for security classification. To this end, future work may
explore how answers to short surveys after incident notifications
– for example, allowing users to rate their confidence that the
incident was a true positive and provide detailed information
about what they think happened – can be fed back into security
classifiers to improve incident identification accuracy.
We hypothesize that creating this explicit feedback look
between user and platform – through post-incident user
feedback and classifier transparency – will enhance users’ sense
of partnership with the platform, which is already partially
created through the secondary authentication process. We found
that this sense of partnership increased users’ sense of safety
and engagement in the incident response process.
Finally, beyond the design of security classifiers and no-
tifications, our results also have implications for secondary
authentication mechanisms. The emphasis on known attackers
among many of our participants not only informs future
research, but also suggests potential vulnerabilities in existing
secondary authentication methods: identifying pictures of
friends may be difficult for a hacker who doesn’t know you, but
could be quite easy for someone who does. As shown in recent
research on the privacy and security risks for domestic violence
victims [80] account access by known attackers can be equally,
or even more dangerous, than access by unknown attackers.
As such, we urge focus on known attacker threat models in
the ongoing development of user security mechanisms.
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